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ABSTRACT
This chapter considers youth offending and youth justice in contemporary China noting significant changes 
due to the rapid economic transformation. Once famous for its low crime rates, the apparent rapid rise 
in Chinese juvenile delinquency has left the media ‘wondering what transformed these little “flowers of 
the motherland” into “carnivorous plants”. The chapter charts changes from the yanda (hard strikes) 
crackdown in 1983 to the highly publicised anti-crime crackdown in Chongqing. Despite limited data, 
a picture is emerging of changing influence of triads and altered relationships between organised crime 
and street gangs, noting street gangs are increasing due to an influx of rural migrants to the mega-cities. 
The chapter touches upon the risk factors and emergent arguments of this contemporary phenomenon, 
noting that Zhang et al (1997:299) has suggested that ‘China is in an early stage of gang development’ 
possibly equivalent to the USA from 1930s to the 1960s.
INTRODUCTION
This chapter considers aspects of youth offending and youth justice in contemporary China which has 
been changing over the past two decades. In many ways youth offending is similar to that in the West, 
however recent rapid economic transformation has initiated rapid changes in the nature and presenta-
tion of youth offending. Once famous for its low rates of crime and juvenile delinquency, the apparent 
rapid rise in Chinese juvenile delinquency has left the media ‘wondering what transformed these little 
“flowers of the motherland” into “carnivorous plants” in a country striving for a harmonious society’, 
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(China Daily 23rd February 2013). The chapter charts changes over the past thirty years from the yanda 
(hard strikes) crackdown in 1983 to the contemporary and highly publicised anti-crime crackdowns in 
Chongqing. Despite some obscure Chinese data a picture is now emerging of changing influence of triads 
and altering relationships between organised crime and street gangs. After reviewing a typology of Asian 
gangs the chapter considers how street gangs appear to be on the rise in China largely due to the large 
influx of migrants from rural China to the rapidly urbanised mega cities. These issues are currently the 
centre of public debate in China and the chapter touches upon the risk factors and emergent arguments 
in relation to this contemporary phenomenon. Zhang et al (1997:299) has suggested that ‘China is in an 
early stage of gang development’ possibly equivalent to the USA from 1930s to the 1960s.
Youth Offending and Youth Justice in China
The above scenario in Hong Kong has become a noticeable and regular feature, particularly on many of 
the large public housing projects surrounding the city, notably the New Towns like Sheung Shui, Fanling, 
Tuen Mun, Tai Po, and Tseung Kwan O. Whilst generating much press and publicity they are indicators 
of changes taking place in the level, type and activity of youth street gangs in China. Lam Kin-keung, a 
retired detective station sergeant who spent eight years with the Organized Crime and Triad Bureau has 
noted that youth street gangs appear to flourish in such public housing neighbourhoods. Many affiliates 
of these groups are said to be instantly recognisable from their speech, their dress and their posture. 
Whilst some have direct, definitive links with triads, for others such links are obscured or more ambigu-
ous. Regardless of this the consequence is often the same, young people coming together to fight with 
steak knives, clubs, and bottles or iron pipes.
Increasingly the participants are getting younger:
They are lost, suffer low self-esteem, come from poverty and abusive backgrounds. They are youngsters 
who can’t find respect - with nowhere else to turn but to the triad societies who give them a sense of 
belonging they’ve never known before. Experts note a disturbing trend that recruits entering the triads 
are increasingly becoming younger. (Deng, 2011)
Box 1. From ‘little flowers of the motherland’ into ‘carnivorous plants’: the changing face of youth gang 
crime in contemporary China: Case study
It’s 11 pm and it’s plain, something is going on down that 50-meter-long alley in Shek Wu Hui. A dozen kids, maybe 14-16, shifting 
around in an agitated manner, can be going nowhere. The orange light from the street lamp above catches odd highlights revealing the 
dye jobs on some of the kids’ hair. Some have their arms tattooed and black T-shirts can be seen on more than a few. There is an air of 
nervous apprehension as if something is going to happen. Loud music blares from the game arcades across the street, where inside, young 
guys are focused on games like Warcraft and King of Fighters.  
A couple of older kids, maybe 17-or-19-year-old, seem to be watching for something, standing like sentinels at the entrance to the alley 
that leads to the back of the games arcade. About 10 meters away is the entrance to still another alley - this one narrower and much, much 
darker. A few 20-somethings are hanging out there. They smoke. Some stand. Some squat. Some are on cell phones. A couple of cars are 
cruising around the streets, windows rolled down. Between the two they carry ten young adults. The conventional wisdom down here is 
that if they have to “get away”, they can do it faster with the air conditioner turned off. 
There’s going to be a fight, says an insider, who knows the scene. The scenario has become pretty common over the last few months. Two 
branches of the local Wo Shing Wo triad are having a feud. The battles play out in Shek Wu Hui, the district hub surrounded by scores 
of public housing estates in Sheung Shui. The stage seems set for a bloody battle. Only the timely arrival of the Police Department’s 
Emergency Unit is able to defuse the situation and prevent violence.
Source: Deng (2011) Bloody-minded youth, China Daily HK Edition 23rd June 2011
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Retired detective Kin-Keung suggests, “This is because the gang leaders of different factors (branches) 
- whether they belong to the same triad tong or not - are having more and more direct control over their 
followers than the dragon heads do. In order to augment their power, the gang leaders have to recruit 
lots of deviant kids,” Continuing his observations he noted that “The phenomena of the triad committing 
crimes in recent years shows not only more active moves among lower level of triad members, but that 
they are younger. The expansion of a triad branch can happen very quickly. And the way they commit 
crimes is getting more ferocious”, (Deng 2011-06-23).
Youth crime in China has been changing for the past two decades; however indications are that these 
changes are now faster and more profound, leading some public debates to question what has happened 
to Chinese youth? The headline for the China Daily in 25th June 2015 declared ‘String of youth violence 
cases shocks nation’. The article quoted a survey by the China Youth and Children Research Centre 
stated that juvenile delinquents were getting younger with more crime linked to drugs and internet use: 
of China’s 279 million juveniles, more than 70 per cent of crimes in 2014 were committed by young 
people aged between 10 and 25 yrs. The report also emphasises aspects of a ‘moral deficit in parenting’, 
(China Daily 25th June 2015).
Migration from rural to urban China is also a causal factor for increased delinquency. The sociology 
professor at Central China Normal University, Mei Zhigang, says that increasingly juvenile delinquent 
behaviour in China is being conducted in groups and that this often involves violence, drugs or sexual 
abuse. He noted that young offenders are often children of the ‘left behind’ migrant children population, 
now nearing 100 million, (China Daily 23rd Sept 2013).
Once famous for its low rates of crime and juvenile delinquency, the apparent rapid rise in Chinese 
juvenile delinquency has left the media ‘wondering what transformed these little “flowers of the moth-
erland” into “carnivorous plants” in a country striving for a harmonious society’, (China Daily 23rd 
February 2013).
In many ways youth offending in China echoes that of the Western industrialised countries, according 
to Shen and Hall (2015). Their study explores the philosophical bases, policy and practice of Chinese 
youth justice and contextualises the pattern and nature of youth offending in contemporary China. Whilst 
they note that Chinese youth justice does not differ formally from that of the Western nations, they rec-
ommend the suspension of assumptions when considering the situation in China.
Data on juvenile offending and youth crime can be difficult to locate and that which is available ap-
pears to indicate rising levels of youth offending. China’s courts sentenced 322,061 juvenile’s in 2008, 
88,891 of whom were minors under 16, a 1.58 per cent increase year-on-year and making up 32 per 
cent of overall convictions nationwide. Numbers of juvenile crimes nationwide were 41,763 in 2000, 
rising to 58,870 in 2003 and 71,472 in 2005. In terms of crime types, robbery accounts for 35 per cent 
of all juvenile crimes and theft for 38 per cent. Fighting and quarrels were listed as 8 per cent and gang 
brawls for 4 per cent. In Shenzhen, 98.55 per cent of juvenile crimes were committed by youngsters 
without a local government household registration, (i.e. migrant), (China Daily - People’s Court Review 
7th May 2009).
The issue of rising crime levels in China is once more high on the public, government and media 
agenda. In 2009 one headline in the China Daily announced that ‘Crime is a risk to stability: Official’. It 
claimed that ‘China faces an uphill battle to maintain social stability this year as crime figures continue 
to rise, according to the country’s top judicial leaders’, (China Daily, 16th Feb 2009). This led to calls to 
improve the system of prosecution, notably at district and county level and also to calls to guard against 
corruption. Similar headlines continue to appear driving national debates and influencing the public 
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mood, often constructing crime as a threat to national security and social harmony. In 2015 the China 
Daily headline noted ‘Gang activity in Guangdong poses ‘serious threat’ - Lin Weixiong, Director of 
Criminal Investigations Bureaus under the Guangdong Dept. of Public Security, stated that task forces 
were needed to fight gangs involved in drugs, counterfeiting and vote-buying in local elections. This 
was considered to be a ‘serious threat to grassroots governments and organisations’ this often interfered 
with township and village elections’, (China Daily, 10th July 2015).
However this is not the first time that crime rises hare garnered news headlines prompting policy 
outcomes. In fact, periodic crime upswings have been a topic of public debate for the past 30 years. Af-
ter the commencement of Communist rule China often pro-claimed its success as an almost crime-free 
society. Against this backdrop, and a baseline of close to zero, any increase in offending might seem 
not only notable, but potentially alarming. As such, increased crime and rates of crime has become one 
of many factors arising from rapid urbanisation and significant social change occurring in China. For 
many, it is a consequence of the speed of change; for others, it is more a symptom of the type of changes 
occurring and the inequalities arising from these changes. The reaction to these periodic upswings in 
crime has on occasion been for the central government to initiate a ‘crackdown’ on crime which for many 
observers is an opportunity for tighter social control. For example, one such crackdown was announced 
by Vice-minister of Public Security, Zhang Xinfeng, in the run up to National Day. His announcement 
instigated a five month nationwide campaign to improve public security in the run up to the 60th an-
niversary of the found of the People’s Republic. The campaigns which involved a crackdown on both 
gangs and organised crime had the stated aim of ‘harmonious social environment’,(‘Crackdown on crime 
in run-up to National Day’, China Daily 28th April 2009).
Not all academics are in agreement that crime rises have in the past been real statistical events. Bak-
ken (2004) in his analysis of China’s criminal justice system argues that a critical examination of China’s 
crime rate does not, for example, support the belief that a crime surge took place in the 1980s. During 
the early 1980s as economic policies became increasingly liberalised and progressive, China underwent 
what he describes as a ‘moral panic about juvenile crime’. Arguing against any evidence pointing towards 
a ‘surge’ in crime, he argues that any rise would be a natural occurrence given the rapid urbanisation and 
population growth, including the maturing of the Chinese Baby boomer population into adolescence, 
e.g. the population of 14-25 yr olds in China rose dramatically from under 120 million to 272 million 
in 1987, (Bakken, 2004). He contends that the various anti-crime campaigns which are subsequently 
undertaken are linked instead to the legitimacy requirements of the communist party regime and its stated 
defence of the social and moral order of a society undergoing rapid social change.
One such anti-crime campaign undertaken in 1983 was the yanda (hard strikes) anticrime campaign. 
Bakken (2004) claims this was caused largely by a moral panic about youth crime, particularly targeted 
youth gang leaders (touzi) rather than corrupt officials or illicit entrepreneurs. Bakken claims the re-
gime needed to demonstrate authority and control in society and boost its legitimacy whilst undertaking 
market reforms.
Under the hard strikes campaign the harshest punishments, including capital punishment, were often 
conducted in public. This included the execution of gang leaders in an attempt to dissolve gangs and 
eliminate gang recruitment. Summary trials were held of gang leaders aged 16 and over and this became 
a conspicuous feature of the campaign (Bakken 2004). In 2009, The Yangjiang Municipal Intermedi-
ate People’s court passed death sentences on five people for the murders of four others by a 43 strong 
criminal gang. Two were also fined 310 million yuan (US$45.4 million) and 325 million yuan. The gang 
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had admitted involvement in tax evasion, illegal gambling dens, extortion and lynchings, issuing false 
invoices and using guns for enforcement, (China Daily 4th Dec 2009).
The true picture here is sadly somewhat obscured as Chinese data is unreliable and often politically 
and socially constructed, including manipulation and ‘creative accounting’ of crime figures. Bakken is 
critical of this form of ‘penal populism’ directed by Deng Xiaoping, but accepts that penal populism 
‘has a strong foothold in China, (Bakken 2004, p80). Setting the data aside, such policy responses set 
the template for government reaction to rising crime rates and creating the timely space for political 
opportunism.
Despite the anti-crime campaigns of the early 1980s the effect on crime itself was clearly limited as 
more often than nought such criminal gangs and networks survived and thrived. In 1989 a three volume 
report on crime by the Chinese government identified an increase in gang crime and linked the rises to 
modernisation and the relaxation of state control. The report identified 36,000 gangs and 138,000 gang 
members, active in China (Dutton 1997). This compares with analysis in the USA (Egley & Howell 
2011 as cited in Pyrooz & Decker 2013, p254) which suggests that there are 28,100 gangs and 731,000 
gang members operating in the USA.
By the 1990s the evidence of increased juvenile delinquency in China was all pointing in one direc-
tion. By 1999, Wong (1999), and other academics as Zhang (1997; 1998), were in agreement that the 
improvement and growth in the Chinese economy has led to a genuine statistical increase in delinquency. 
The increase in juvenile delinquency has also impacted upon the criminal justice and youth justice pro-
vision. The Juvenile Protection law (1991) and the Preventing Juvenile Delinquency law (1999) were 
established to set out and define the duties, responsibilities and authorities of parents and guardians 
regarding child welfare, education and juvenile justice. Wong also notes that with these new laws there 
is a noticeable shift from the traditional Chinese model of informal intervention to a more formal struc-
tured intervention of delinquency control which might lead to increased custodial sentences for young 
offenders, (Wong 2004). In China both informal grassroots networks and formal correctional institutions 
both have a role to play in controlling delinquency. Wong (1999) however contends that the develop-
ment of fair and independent juvenile justice systems is hampered by low levels of skilled manpower 
and frequent volunteers staff turnover compounded by the relationship between the control systems and 
the Communist party machine.
Zhang (1997) advises that research on juvenile justice and delinquency remain largely descriptive 
with scant trend analysis. In 2001 the China Daily was already reporting the need for improved and in-
creased probation services to curb the rising tide of juvenile delinquency, (China Daily 17th Feb 2001).
Coupled with debates about increased delinquency amongst juveniles have been high profile drives 
against corruption and diminishing trust in the Chinese police, particularly in urban areas, (Wu, Sun, Hu, 
2015). Trust varies considerably across the key urban cities and some observers and academics consider 
China to have a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ regarding its police service, (Sun, Hu, Wu, 2012).
Fast forward to 2014/15 and Chinese societies have witnessed a dramatic growth, not only in social 
and economic terms but in terms of youth crime and delinquency (Xi, 2001; Ngai 2004; Zhang et al, 
1993). In China researchers report that the growth of crime and delinquency is largely down to the rise in 
gang involvement of delinquent youth and that much crime in China involves delinquent youth (Xi 2001).
Public debates, press and media coverage and academic research now centres on the following con-
tributory issues and outcomes: changes in the activities of organised crime networks and the loosening 
power of the triads; the emergence and expansion of drug trafficking and new drug markets; the role of 
rural-urban migration and deprived migrant youth; the emergence of youth street gangs; the expansion 
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of youth street gangs in urbanised areas of china and issues of parenting and social control. All of which 
has taken place as a consequence of rapidly changing socio-economic conditions arising from market 
liberalisation. This chapter will examine each of these above points in more detail.
Before we focus on China, it is important to consider how Asian gangs are researched and studied and 
to clarify what is known about different types of youth gang and organised crime group operating in Asia.
Studying Gangs and Organized Crime in Asia and China
Criminology in China, and other parts of Asia, remains a fairly nascent discipline. Academic and insti-
tutional research however remains many years behind that of the West. Despite this fact, an emerging 
body of Chinese criminological studies (Chin 1990; Chin, Huang 2007, Kelly & Fagan 1993; Liu 2004; 
Song & Dombrink 1994; Song 1996; Wang et al 2002, Wang 2013, Zhang 2014, Zhang et al 1997, 
Zhang et al 2008, Zhou et al 2004) is expanding the knowledge base and opening up the debates on the 
applicability of Western theory to occidental social and geo-political conditions. Research into Chinese 
gangs is similarly engaged and is beginning to present insights into rising delinquency, risk factors for 
gang affiliation, youth gang involvement, links to organised crime and gambling syndicates, government 
crackdowns and punitive responses. The Challenges of conducting such research in China are exacerbated 
by numerous methodological barriers which in many ways need ways of thinking to overcome them. 
One key issue in China is differentiating between normative youth behaviour, youth criminal activity, 
youth street gangs and organised crime linked to, or not linked to, national, or even international, crime 
syndicates. This confusing picture is central to an understanding of crime in China.
Whilst gang research in the US benefits from a long and informed academic tradition, US gang re-
search into Asian gangs and organised crime operating in the US, lags somewhat behind. This is partially 
explained by various methodological challenges facing those studying Asian gang active in the US, 
(Song, 1996). Some of these issues identified by Song, (and listed below), will doubtless be pertinent 
in gang research in Asia and specifically China, namely:
• The unique cultural characteristics and modus operandii of the various criminal groups operating 
in Asia differs hugely – e.g. drug trafficking groups, Japanese Yakuza, Vietnamese gangs; Tongs, 
Triads; Taiwanese immigrant gangs; Korean gangs, etc. Thus an understanding of domestic and 
also international cultural interactions and geo-politics is required.
• The various groups such as organised criminal gangs, triads or underground societies, tongs, 
gangs, etc, all require accurate classification before research can effectively be undertaken.
• There is a need to re-examine the boundaries of these groups, especially the interfaces between 
youth gangs and organised crime when talking of Asian crime groups
• Language and cultural barriers are frequently exhibited in Asian gang research with China for ex-
ample having four major dialects. (In the USA, Asian communities have 34 distinct ethnic groups 
and even term Asian is unhelpful).
• In the absence of data and reports from NGOs, secondary analysis is often over-reliant on media 
and public documents
• There are no systematic efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of enforcement measures against 
gangs or organised crime.
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• There is a lack of availability of public documents regarding key data and statistics for example, 
migration patterns, policing operations, recorded ethnicity, levels of crime reporting and crime 
recording, etc.
• The exclusive nature of migrant communities and the hidden and secretive nature of organised 
crime remain a further barrier to research on gangs and organised crime.
It is important to address such methodological deficits for research into Asian groups and organised 
to move forwards.
Typology of Gangs in Asia
The study of Asian gangs requires clarity regarding the boundaries of the various different criminally 
active groups. Whilst issues of definition continue to consume Western academics and defy consensus, 
some similar challenges occupy academic study of Asian criminal enterprises. Most academics focus 
specifically on one type of criminal enterprise and few have sought to classify Asian gangs or to arrange 
them on a spectrum which might help clarify for the lay-person the activities, and the networked con-
nections, if any, operating between them. Hua-Lun Huang’s (2007) work is one exception to this as he 
has tried to offer a typological analysis of Delinquent Asian gangs.
Huang argues that differences in gangs are relative and not absolute. He offers a typology of Asian 
gangs based on three factors – political belief, organisation level and structure and political connection. 
Thus he identifies 8 different types which operate or have operated in Asia. Delinquent gangs here refer 
to ‘three dissimilar but comparable associations, namely delinquent groups, street gangs, and organized 
crime ‘enterprise’, (Huang 2007, p129). He then takes the three categories of political belief, organisational 
structure and political connection and sub-divides them into two different levels: ‘salient/inconspicuous 
ideology for political belief; tiered/egalitarian organizational arrangements for organisational structure, 
and patron-client/ no patron-client relationship for political connection’, (Huang 2007, p130). Based on 
these different combinations he offers a classification system for the different types of Asian gangs. This 
helps differentiate quasi-political or ideological groups from street based groups.
Huang suggests that those groups with a salient ideology should be considered as expressive groups 
or ‘dreamseekers’ attempting to realise a stated long-term goal. Those with an inconspicuous ideology 
however are instrumental groups interested in pursuing economic goals. He claims this classification 
allows for all historical or contemporary groups to be accounted for, (Huang 2007).
Huang adopts a typological approach to gang classification arguing that gang appearance and growth 
is linked to territorial expansionism, nationalism, religious extremism of other similar ideology. He 
suggests that this typology approach is more comprehensive, and therefore more suited to Asia, than 
typologies based on the Chicago School ecological paradigm. Table 1, below, illustrates the various 
groupings identified by Huang.
For those seeking to understand the key differences between the active criminal groups in Asia and 
to familiarise themselves with the range of activity, this is useful starting point. However as a conceptual 
tool it is useful in elucidating distinctions between various groupings. Certainly the focus on ideology 
is helpful in explaining why certain gangs have an extenuated lifecycle but it is also helpful in under-
standing how gangs operate, recruit and conduct business. This chapter shall now focus or the issues of 
organised crime in China, starting with the role of the ‘dark societies’ or triads before considering the 
links between triads and street gangs.
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Street Gangs vs. Organised Crime
Distinctions between street gangs and organised crime groups was first identified by Thrasher in 1927, 
followed by others such as Cloward and Ohlin (1960), Spergel (1961), Potter (1994), Klein (1995), and 
Varese (2006). Assessing and clarifying the differences became important for academics and also for 
the criminal justice system in terms of enforcement and sanctions. Research into US gangs by Jankowski 
(1991) noted key differences between street gangs and organised crime at the upper level whilst there 
was also differences between street gangs and ‘crews’ or groups of youth operating at the lower level. 
Curry, Decker and Pyrooz (2014) argue that criminal activity operates on a spectrum from disorganised 
street gangs up to organised crime and gangs both vary and evolve overtime. In this way Western theory 
and research echoes the views of Huang and his conceptualisation of the Asian typology and context. As 
in Western gang research it is still important, if not critical, to distinguish between street level criminal 
groups and organised crime.
Varese (2010) describes organised crime as specialised networks that rely upon expertise, rather 
than hierarchy, to undertake criminal activity for financial gain. Recent changes in society have possibly 
added a further level of distinction between street gangs and organised crime for example, international 
or transnational organised crime groups increasingly utilise information technology and now often oper-
ate, as Dishman (2005, p237) describes them, as a ‘leaderless nexus’.
Table 1. Typology of Asian Gangs
Type Example
Salient ideology + tiered structure + patron-client relationship in 
politics
The Black Dragon Society. An ultra-nationalist organisation 
formed in Japan in 1901
Salient ideology + egalitarian structure + patron-client 
relationships in politics
Chinese triads. Loosely structured groups of ultra-rightist 
nationalists.
Salient ideology + tiered structure + No patron-client relationship 
in politics
Abu Sayyaf guerrilla/pirates active as Islamic insurrectionists 
in the southern Philippines engaged in banditry, kidnapping and 
piracy.
Salient ideology + egalitarian structure + No patron-client 
relationship in politics
The Seven Princesses (female) gang in Korea. Those who operate 
as ‘social bandits’, peasant robbers or ‘virtuous Robin Hoods’.
Inconspicuous Ideology + tiered structure + patron-client 
relationship in politics
Yamaguchi Gumi of Japan. Partially hidden hierarchical crime 
syndicate.
Inconspicuous ideology + egalitarian structure + patron-client 
relationship in politics
Sun Yee On – the largest and most powerful Triad society of Hong 
Kong. Operates with less bureaucracy than the organised criminal 
enterprise of the Yamaguchi Gumi.
Inconspicuous ideology + tiered structure + No patron-client 
relationship in politics
Organised pauper gangs or gai bang. These organised beggar 
rings act a street families and are often headed up by a senior male 
beggar or ‘grandpa’ who ensures the group finds food, shelter and 
work.
Inconspicuous ideology + egalitarian structure + no patron-client 
relationship in politics
Chinese, Chinese/Vietnamese or Southeast Asian gangs operating 
in the US and Canada. No associated to tongs, these are profit 
oriented street gangs raising in income from drugs, vice fraud and 
gambling.
Source: Huang (2007) From the Asian Boys to the Zhu Lian Bang (the Bamboo Union Gang): A Typological analysis of Delinquent 
Asian Gangs. Asian Criminology 2: 127-143.
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The high-level organised crime syndicates in China differ considerably from youth street gangs, 
operating secretly and managing huge financial deals; it is in their interests to maintain a low profile. 
The principal criminal activity of these groups is gambling and its associated activities including vice 
and money laundering. In 2009 during a money laundering trial 22 organised crime members, including 
a local policeman were charged and sentenced for using threats of violence to compel trade, extortion, 
assaults, actual bodily harm, prostitution, false accounting and gambling since 2003, (China Daily, 16th 
Dec 2009).
Since 2006 Beijing courts have convicted 12,796 people in connection with 1,171 cases of organized 
crime according to the Supreme People’s Court. Of these 4 per cent were sentenced to more than five 
years in prison. These figures relate to the nationwide crackdown on organized crime instigated early in 
2006 to July 2009. Police had investigated 1,267 organised crime cases and disrupted 13,000 gangland 
organisations. Of these more than 400 were involved in construction, mining and wholesale sectors 
with the proceeds of these exceeding 4 billion yuan (US$588million). The investigations also included 
108,000 other cases including 419 homicides and more than 10,000 assaults. Authorities claimed these 
results had led to a decrease in violent crime such that by 2008 violent crime was down 11 per cent 
compared to 2005 (the year prior to the campaign) with 2,700 firearms also seized, (China Daily & 
Xinhua 1st Sept. 2009).
The Deputy Director of the Criminal Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) 
said ‘gangdom is still active in China’, noting that gangsters often operated under the ‘protective um-
brella’ of government departments and judiciary departments. From February 2006 and July 2009 Chi-
nese prosecutors authorised the arrests of 44,319 people involved in 9,000 gang crime cases. Of these 
42,000 were successfully prosecuted with more than 1,300 sent to labour re-education camps, (China 
Daily & Xinhua 1st Sept. 2009).
Re-education camps are strictly controlled by tight legal procedures and offenders are designated to 
the camps following an initial proposal from the police. This proposal is then approved by the labour 
camp management committee which consists of officials from the judiciary, labour, personnel and public 
security departments alongside representatives from workers, youth and women’s organisations. Detention 
is supervised by prosecuting agencies. Gang members who are detained in prisons by the Ministry of 
Justice are purposefully located in prisons outside their home region to reduce opportunities for contact 
with previous accomplices and to disrupt their networks. Upon release they are subject to stricter parole 
and probation conditions, (China Daily & Xinhua 1st Sept. 2009).
Gambling
All gambling in mainland China was outlawed until the first welfare lottery was established in 1987. 
Despite this gambling socially has long been a Chinese social pastime.
In 1978 China’s ‘open door’ policy and subsequent economic reforms made profitable economic 
development and entrepreneurship a national goal, (Liu 2008) and this came a massive expansion of il-
legal gambling. However the race for profits, now nationally sanctioned, opened the door for numerous 
‘get rich quick’ schemes. Numerous opportunities now presented for illicit enterprise. To understand 
this complex picture more clearly it is useful to consider in more detail how gambling works and how 
it offers illicit business opportunities for the triads.
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Three types of gambling schemes operating in China by organised crime syndicates have since been 
identified (Wang and Antonopoulos (2015): - local gambling dens; trans-regional gambling rings and 
online gambling networks. Each of these enterprises strategises to optimise the most favourable financial 
returns in the face of police surveillance and suppression.
Wang and Antonopoulos (2015) note that ‘in a country such as China where the legal system is weak 
and the working of the government is opaque, personal connections (guanxi) have become extremely 
important in various aspects of Chinese business and personal life, including illegal activities, (see also 
Broadhurst 2012). Gaunxi helps to identify customers, partners, and players and also helps to recover 
debts. It may also help secure financing, resolve disputes and obtain police protection, (Wang & Anto-
nopoulos 2015). Guanxi is the key resource for running these connections and acts as both social glue 
for personal and professional connections but also social lubricant for all transactions.
In the traditional off-shore gambling haven of Macau four major crime syndicates are involved in roll-
ing or exchanging chips. They have all set up sub-branches or agencies in mainland China or they link up 
with mainland Chinese gangs in order to recover debts (Varese 2011). Debt collection is undertaken by 
criminal gangs and may involve abduction, assault, torture blackmail and murder. Many businesses try 
to keep face or (mianzi) and so will pay up through the guanxi networks, (Wang & Antonopoulos 2015).
The Chinese government are aware of such criminal syndicates and have recently acted to disrupt 
and destroy them.
Periodic ‘Crackdowns’
To address the issues of organised crime and the rise in youth offending about gangs, periodic ‘crack-
downs’ are initiated by local and by central government.
In 2006 China instigated a ‘crackdown’ on criminal activity leading to the prosecution of upwards of 
70,000 gang-related crimes between 2006 and December 2008. This ‘crackdown’ led to a reduction in 
murder, robbery and physical assaults of approximately 4per cent for two years. Data from the Supreme 
People’s Court indicated that 337 gang crimes were processed in 2007 which was up 161 per cent year on 
year. In 2006 and 2007 more than 6,000 criminals received sentences for gang-related offences. Profes-
sor of Criminal Law at China University of Political Science, Liang Huaren echoed the comments from 
the Director commenting that the upsurge in gang-related crime was related to the changing economic 
and social landscape of China which exacerbated growing inequalities and which were most noticeable 
between unemployed workers and migrants and others. Whilst gangs and organised crime were clearly 
linked together and in places indistinguishable, it was suggested that the traditional gang activities of 
prostitution, gambling, drug production and trafficking were being supplemented by new criminal activity 
in the construction industry, transport and mining sectors. Money disputes often provided opportunities 
for gang involvement which then led to racketeering. Gangs were also thought to seek protection by 
establishing close business links with government officials and corrupt police officials, (Zhu Zie, China 
Daily, 22nd Dec 2008).
By 2008 China was planning a ‘special unit to tackle gangs’ – identified as organised criminal 
groups. Speaking via the China Daily a senior official of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) said, 
‘A new division is being planned to combat growing mafia style gangs in the country’. The director of 
the ministry stated that the fight against gang crime would be a ‘lasting task’ and sought new legislation 
to address the issue. Continuing, he said, ‘gangs will remain active as the country undergoes dramatic 
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social and economic changes’. He went further by saying, ‘Gang related crimes have become a threat 
to our social stability and the economy’, (Zhu Zie, China Daily, 22nd Dec 2008).
In June 2009 authorities in Chongqing instigated a high profile crackdown on organised crime in the 
city involving 3,000 police, the aim being to dismantle gangs in the city. By August 2009 police had 
detained 1,544 suspected gangsters from 14 organised gangs with a further 469 suspects still at large. 
During this crackdown multiple firearms, ammunition and assets were retrieved. Liu Guanglei, Team 
leader of the city’s campaign against organised crime was quoted as saying, ‘Chongqing will struggle to 
stay safe if we don’t crack down on the organised gangs’. Xinhua News Agency was quoted as report-
ing that ‘scores of police officers also accused of protecting criminal gangs have been detained’. It was 
also reported that local citizens helped in this crackdown by providing useful tip offs, (China Daily 18th 
August 2009).
Similarly from August to September 2009 police in Guangdong province, Hong Kong and Macao 
worked in partnership to break up more than 1,340 gangs and address cross-border crime. This operation 
included 1,872 cases connected to triads and targeted phone and online scams as well as drug manufac-
turing and trafficking. A total of 8,139 suspects were detained alongside 185 unlicensed firearms and 
7.15Million yuan (US$1.05million),(China Daily 25th Sept 2009).
A further notable ‘crackdown’ was in Chongqing where multiple premises were closed following a high 
profile intervention organised by the Chongqing government from June 2009 – Nov 2011, (Broadhurst 
2013; Wang 2013). The Chongqing crackdown became the most high profile ‘anti-mafia campaign’ in 
China and was reported worldwide. It was aimed at putting local criminal organisations out of business 
whilst offering opportunities to crusade against key influential business and senior government officials 
under whose auspices the syndicates flourished, (Broadhurst 2013; Broadhurst & Wang 2014).
Triads
One element of organised crime instantly recognisable as associated with China is that of the triads. The 
Term triad (which is actually English) describes ‘dark societies’ but overtime has become synonymous 
with organised crime in China. However, there is considerable imprecision when trying to describe or 
define both organised crime in China or triads, (Broadhurst & Wa, 2009).
China has a long tradition of triads or semi-secret societies. These were originally formed several 
hundred years ago as underground political agit-prop groups and have evolved into large societal organi-
sations in most Chinese societies, in China and overseas. Traditionally these organisations of adult men 
operated as nationalistic or quasi-political societies before transferring into quasi-governmental groups 
exacting strong-arm functions for various regional administrators across China. After a higher profile 
involvement in the Boxer Rebellion they retreated into more secretive criminal underworlds from the mid 
20th Century. They also have a long history relating to repeated waves of Chinese immigration entering 
Hong Kong and this has permitted them to maintain recruitment, power and influence.
In communities such as Hong Kong, which are overwhelmingly established and composed of im-
migrants, the social networks afforded by triad societies was invaluable and the triads offered migrants 
protection to those vulnerable to unemployment or social exclusion.
Essentially triads now operate as hierarchical organisations offering entrepreneurial opportunities 
for organised criminal ventures in China, but also in the SE Asia where significant Chinese populations 
are domiciled, (Chin 1990a; Chin 1986). Famously triads also operate in the USA.
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Triads in the US
Importantly similar methods of extortion operate in the United States Chinese community largely oper-
ated via the triad societies, (Kelly, Chin, Fagan, 1993). In comparing Chinese gangs in New York City, 
Chin (1990) identifies several distinctive factors which differentiate Chinese gangs from those of Black, 
Hispanic or Italian decent. Namely they have their origins in the social and cultural life of the immigrant 
communities rather than youth fads, fashion or drugs. This facet leads to gangs becoming deeply en-
meshed in local business – both legitimate and illegitimate – offering opportunities for financial, social 
and cultural advancement. This is quite separate from how gangs operate in other communities. The 
influence of triad society within wider communities is another key difference.
The Asian gangs operating in the US do not necessarily operate in the deprived urban communities 
typical of black or Hispanic gangs, but instead thrive in Chinese communities which present multiple 
and varied business opportunities. Chin (1990) notes they are embedded in the triad subculture which 
is constructed and maintained by secret Chinese societies. Chinese gangs in the US are therefore able 
to copy or adopt similar practices as operated by triads in China and then claim hereditary rights and 
links to triad societies. In this way triad norms can be adopted and offer a form of internationalised 
triad activity including adopting rituals and initiation rites. This tactic permits them to be viewed by the 
Chinese community as something more than simple street gangs offering certain legitimacy and even 
romantic historical provenance, (Chin 1990). This in turn creates a shroud of mystery and cultural sig-
nificance which often generates high levels of fear and intimidation amongst local Chinese populations. 
This generates an influence which is based on more than violence and thus again it differs from other 
ethnic gangs. Chin (1990) also suggests that in some places these triad connections are loosening and 
may change in the future, with the possibility of Chinese gangs adopting and more international street 
gang flavour. Vietnamese gangs and Fujianese gangs now operate outside of the triad sub-culture and 
their involvement in street robbery and burglary again distance them from the traditional triads.
Triads in Southern China and Hong Kong
Triad activity includes racketeering and protection in all its forms with local small business including taxis, 
restaurants, street hawkers and local shops suffering either extortion or enforced price fixing. Alongside 
extortion often sits money lending, loan-sharking and then debt collection. Drug sales ‘patches’ or turfs 
are sometimes sold to street gangs as part of the drug distribution network. Commercial vice operations 
such as prostitution, sex shops, brothels, gaming halls are targeted alongside more legit operations such 
as karaoke bars and nightclubs. Hong Kong triads are actively involved in the operation of night-time 
economy outlets such as saunas, nightclubs, bars, and lounges often operating with an affluent clientele. 
Hong Kong merchants often report difficulties in conducting business expansion and may find their 
business investment put at risk due to triad gangs seeking to engage in coercion or extortion for rival 
companies or groups.
Construction sites, waste disposal and transport groups can be subject to monopoly control and 
intimidation even takes place within the film industry in Hong Kong. In addition loan-sharking, debt 
collection, drug trafficking and gambling in various forms are considered natural criminal turf for the 
triads. Counterfeit production of perfumes, cigarettes and fuel smuggling are relatively new additions 
and now sit alongside prostitution and pornography as opportunities for generating profits. Opportuni-
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ties for profiteering and illicit activity are often enhanced by the fact many triads retain profitable links 
with corrupt police and government officials.
Triads often operate as franchise-type organisations and as long as members pay their dues they can 
act independently. Triads were partially financed by franchising street violence to linked street gangs who 
then assisted in intimidation and violence targeted toward both legitimate and illegitimate businesses in 
Hong Kong. Contract enforcement, debt collection and the elimination of competition were key and highly 
publicised violence helped build reputations whilst maintaining compliance and discipline. The long 
term success of triads was also based upon long-established and sub-cultural aspects of loyalty, secrecy 
and brotherhood and this forms the basis of internal discipline which, according to Paoli (2002), is the 
foundational discipline of such societies. The use of rituals is notably for initiation, but is still believed 
to take place in triads though it is often a mystery, (Covey, 2010). Similar codes of honour adopted by 
triads are sometimes found in street gangs (Lee et al 1996).
It is really only when the triads become involved in violent crime do we get an insight into their links 
with organised crime. Paoli notes that triad societies are ‘not exclusively criminal organisations but are 
multi-faceted brotherhoods in the form of loose cartels bound by social as well as economic ties’ (Paoli 
2010, p2). Not all criminal groups or criminal network in Hong Kong are triad related. Triads can be 
compared in some ways to the Sicilian mafia according to Broadhurst and Wa (2010, p3).
Expansion and Displacement
It is widely reported by academics and the media (China Daily - 29th Dec 2012) that Hong Kong triads 
are now pushing north into mainland China largely due to a Hong Kong police crackdown and also the 
opening of new and potentially unexploited, lucrative opportunities. Hong Kong is also believed to be 
at saturation point with high commercial rents and greater competition for making money. This has 
led Hong Kong triads to start using Guangdong province as the back-office location for storing drugs, 
manufacture and storage of counterfeit goods such as fake credit cards.
Local triad meetings and rituals are still conducted in Hong Kong and the regular commercial and 
public traffic between Hong Kong and Guangdong makes it all but impossible to detect these activities. 
Hong Kong police estimate approx 3,000 active Hong Kong triad members are operating on the mainland 
and mostly in Guangdong province. Triad operations in Hong Kong have also not really declined despite 
the police crackdown. Groups such as Sun Yee On, 14K and Wo Shing Wo are all said to be active in 
Shenzhen, Huizhou and Dongguan, (China Daily - 29th Dec 2012).
In Guangdong, recent triad operations are noticeable through a range of incidents, e.g. a notorious 
gangland execution in 2007 which took place in the famous Luk Yu teahouse in Hong Kong; a senior 
triad boss shot in Dongguan; an assassination plot in Shenzhen to kill the founding chairman of the Hong 
Kong Democratic party. Other Hong Kong triads spread out to Macao for lucrative gambling receipts 
and opportunities including managing the VIP rooms at casinos in the city. For example, the Wo triad 
with its factions of Wo Shing Yee, Wo On Lok and Wo Shing Wo are the longest established triad in 
Hong Kong boasting an estimated 20,000 members. Criminal activities such as junket operations for 
high rollers, and loan sharking make up their main income, (China Daily - 29th Dec 2012). Network 
links between Macao and Zhuhai also permit members to lie low in mainland China if police activity in 
Macao becomes too problematic. In the pre-handover months in Macao some 14 people were killed by 
wars between triads and the leader of the notorious 14K group, (‘Broken tooth’) Wan Kwok-koi, served 
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15 years for gang related activities. The Chinese control of Macao is now thought to be considerably 
stronger than in the pre-handover days.
One former Hong Kong police officer with 30 years experience of working with triads states that 
‘triads can only be operated against. They can never be eliminated. It’s like a poisonous fungus. After 
you’ve plucked it, it grows back again’. Moreover the triads operate with lucrative business returns. 
This means that if one triad folds then others will step in to take over the business and start it up again, 
(China Daily - 29th Dec 2012).
Triads and Street Youth Gangs
Through cultural representations and more recently via films, Triads have been romanticised by the 
Chinese as noble cultural societies operating to the Chinese code of Confusion philosophy, (Covey 
2010). From this elevated vantage point they can offer a template to younger, more loosely affiliated 
street gangs who in turn can act as fertile ground for recruitment into triads. The relationships here are 
not fully explored and often remain contested.
Main (1991) views triads as operating on a spectrum from loosely based street gangs to highly or-
ganised criminal networks. Chu (1994, 2000) however suggests triads operate as a pool of potential as-
sociates who come together for criminal activities. He identifies the street gang as the lowest tier of this 
hierarchy, reporting via their gang leaders to area bosses, who in turn were controlled by chairmen. In 
this interpretation, Chu viewed the street gang as operating with a high degree of organisation compared 
to the loose social networks of acquaintances operating at the higher levels.
As a result the degrees of ‘control’ exerted by triads on street gangs may vary by context and by situ-
ation, though it seems commonly agreed that street gangs operate as contractors for the triads in some 
business arrangements (Covey 2010). In this way we may view the relationship between the street gang 
and the triad in much the same way as Western academics have viewed the relationship between the 
urban street gang and organised crime, (Thornberry, Densley, Shelden et al 2001).
The triad is headed by adults however it enlists younger recruits to help sustain its criminal interests. 
Youths may find it offers powerful protection to them with valuable social contacts and often youths 
then seek to enlist. Whilst enlisting may involve some form of ritual, even those who do not formally 
enlist often claim to be acting in or for a triad and can name their gang as a form of triad franchise or 
branch of the society. Street gangs can at times imply connections or links to triads to impress or ward 
off other rivals. Police often have difficulty in determining real triad societies from bogus or falsely 
claimed ones, (Ngai, Cheung & Ngai 2007).
Broadhurst and Wa (2009) agree that triads will hire street based youth groups to help protect illegal 
enterprises; a view supported by both Chin and Zhang 2003. Triads can also be linked with business-
men involved in racketeering, but often these are loosely connected. It is however street gangs that are 
responsible for street level violence. In this way young men from poor and deprived neighbourhoods 
provide the lowest tier of the triad society with triad adults recruiting from such neighbourhoods. These 
adults often act as a successful role model for new recruits or Wannabees recruits, although the age of 
recent arrestees for violence associated with triads does however suggest that triads might be losing 
attraction for younger Hong Kong youth.
The links between triad societies, crime networks and youth street gangs have been researched by 
Lee (2005) and described by Broadhurst and Wa as ‘a dynamic form of symbiosis between triad groups, 
criminal entrepreneurs and delinquent businesses, officials and professionals ...associated with triad-related 
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violence’, (2010, p20). Central to this is the ‘mutual aid orientation’ commonly expressed amongst triad 
societies and their role as ‘protector’ in the overall command structure of illegal and criminal enterprises. 
Although some have become niche operators in the protection business whilst others are more favoured 
as negotiators or financiers. At times this role would expand to include extortion and even generate its 
own criminal outputs.
Broadhurst and Wa (2010) contend that to expand their shared interests, exploit business opportunities 
and see-off rivals, these triad societies developed a simple command structure. This usually involved a 
specialist leader holding strategic governance over the society but linked to underworld criminal net-
works. Such men are highly skilled operators networked through Guanxi. Their ability to quickly muster 
multiple thugs to act as the ‘strong arm’ for the enforcement of protection rackets became a regular 
feature of the presence of triads.
Competition between triads leads occasionally to sporadic violence and ability to organise quick mo-
bilisation is a reputational benefit. Reputational enhancement of triad groups forms a version of ‘street 
capital’ (Harding 2015) and defence of earned reputations can also trigger violence. Other disputes 
occur over territory.
Lethal violence is reportedly declining. According to Broadhurst and Wa (2009) in 1997 approxi-
mately 25 per cent of all homicides were linked to triads but by 2001 this has dropped to 5 per cent, and 
no definable links were evidence by 2004. Fortunately triad linked homicides are infrequent thanks in 
part to the strict control of firearms. Broadhurst and Wa (2009) report that 50 per cent of the homicides 
that occurred in the period 1989- 1998 were related to lower-rank street-level confrontations over hon-
our or territory; 21 per cent of homicides were related to business rivalries between competing illicit 
entrepreneurs; enforcement of ‘discipline’ of customers (for example unpaid debts) accounted for 17 
per cent of homicides; internal sanctions or punishment accounted for 14 per cent and occurred at both 
street-level ranks and syndicate level ranks.
Changes in Secret Societies
Changes in the political economy in Hong Kong (moving from a manufacturing economy to a financial 
services economy) and the end of colonial rule have led to changes in the roles and functions of the triads. 
Essentially triads have adapted to these socio-economic changes and have had to both modernise and 
transform. Broadhurst and Wa claim the aims of the triads ‘have become corporatized and boundaries 
moved beyond traditional predatory street crime, extortion and drug dealing predicated on brand violence 
to diverse ‘grey’ business activities that also include trafficking (anything profitable), vice, copyright, 
Internet and financial service crimes such as money laundering and fraud’. (Broadhurst & Wa, 2010, p2).
Part of this functional adaptation includes some previous triads activities, such as vice and drug 
manufacture, moving from Hong Kong to mainland China where triads are likely to experience con-
siderably reduced surveillance and investigation by the police, largely due to high levels of corruption. 
According to Broadhurst and Wa (2010, p2) this ‘shift in the relative visibility and apparent scope of 
the triads may thus be a form of organisational transformation and displacement stimulated by the ab-
sence of capable guardianship in adjacent cities such as Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and 
elsewhere in Guangdong and China’.
Chin (1990b) found that being associated to a triad in locations such as Taiwan, Macau or HK both 
grants and improves social capital. As a result ‘a degree of overlap and ambiguity between triad society, 
illicit business and ‘organised crime’ is inherent’, (Broadhurst & Wa, 2010, p3).
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Both Chin and Zhang argue that amongst the Chinese diaspora triads have been in decline and they 
cast doubt over the existence of global triad networks, (Chin & Zhang 2003). Hong Kong retains its 
place as a major international hub for transport, finance and business though no evidence has been found 
of any transnational triad organisation. The triads however do control the drug trade at street level. The 
wholesale trafficking of drugs appears to still be organised by small groups of entrepreneurs. They 
note that in Hong Kong the involvement of triads in crime has not increased for the past 20 years. In 
2006 only 3 per cent of recorded crime was designated as triad related. At present Broadhurst and Wa 
(2009) suggest around 50 groups are active according to sources in the Hong Kong Police. The Hong 
Kong police Organised Crime and Triad Bureau undertake routine patrols and surveillance operations 
sometimes leading to raids against suspect groups. They also undertake community youth diversion 
projects in Hong Kong.
Operational Adaptations
Prior to the return of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China, (PRC), the Hong Kong government 
established the Organised and Serious Crimes Ordinance (OSCO) in 1994 which created new powers 
and authority to recoup the proceeds of crime. It was thus aimed at addressing both street-level groups 
and strategic leaders. Through this route the Hong Kong police targeted money laundering and Boiler 
Room Fraud cases issuing restraint orders and confiscation orders. The ultimate goal of such activity has 
been to create a risky environment for triads to operate illegally and to force them to engage in legitimate 
businesses and business practices. The China Daily has headlined the rise in fraud and warned of the 
economic impact upon businesses, (The China Daily 20th Feb 2009).
The transformation of Hong Kong’s economy into a financial services hub for East Asia has been 
coupled with a reduced tolerance of triad violence. The old romantic notions of triad societies appears to 
have a looser grip on the public imagination. The overall effect of the OSCO and other related legislation 
in the 1990s was to begin a shift from the traditional policing relationships between Hong Kong police 
and the triads, which partially tolerated them, to one which demonstrates a focussed hostility towards 
organised crime and attempts to suppress triad subculture. This has had the effect of moving the triads 
from violence, vice and visibility to reduced visibility and more flexible forms of business enterprise. 
(Broadhurst & Wa 2009).
In addition to these internal changes in Hong Kong, specifically how it is policed and the broader 
business environment, there are wider changes in southern China which have led to new developments 
and expanded opportunities for triads whilst their influence in Hong Kong has been decreasing.
Triads now appear to operate a more flexible and elastic form of business enterprise with greater 
emphasis on business and a more open door policy to those wishing to join. This is partially recognised 
as a business response to the fact HK is now fast becoming a service industry society with fewer local 
shops and businesses to exhort. Human trafficking between HK and China has also now ended with the 
handover of HK to China, (Parry, 2013).
The opening of the Chinese economy from the 1980s onwards and the return of Hong Kong to the PRC 
has helped propel the triads through the growth of illicit trade in goods and services to more competitive 
markets in southern China. The liberalisation of cross-border traffic from Hong Kong to China helped 
establish the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and precipitated the extraordinarily rapid urbanisation 
of Shenzhen and Gaungdong province. Shenzhen itself rose in population from a few thousand in 1980 
to almost 15 million by 2014, (Whitwell, 2014).
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These emerging Chinese mainland markets outstripped the ability of regional legislators and authori-
ties to regulate and enforce the newly developing markets and thus created opportunities for corruption 
and protection rackets. Access to justice and dispute resolution was limited and for some unobtainable. 
Crime in Shenzhen soared with 100,000 offences recorded in 2003 and significant rises in homicide, 
assault and kidnapping, (South China Morning Post, 2004). By 2006 Shenzhen became the gateway city 
for drugs for southern China, (South China Morning Post, 2006).
Drugs
Increased urbanisation was spurred on by huge levels of migration from rural areas to the urban cities 
opening up new markets for drugs, notably heroin, ketamine and methamphetamine. As well as a busi-
ness opportunity, drug use itself in China remains a national problem.
Drug trafficking and new entrepreneurial drug syndicates have expanded from Hong Kong to Shen-
zhen and Guangdong province. Though data remains sketchy it is likely that the commercial vice trade 
which once thrived in Hong Kong has similarly been displaced to Guangdong province. Broadhurst and 
Wa (2009), note that triads are now actively attempting to enter new markets for criminal activities such 
as internet gambling, copyright theft, international animal smuggling, counterfeit drugs.
By the end of 2014 China had 2.95 million registered drug users but the actual number is estimated 
to be more than 14 million, according the China National Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC). The 
number of synthetic drug users (approx 1.46 Million) overtook the number of registered heroin users in 
2014. A total 880,000 drug users were arrested in 2014 with 264,000 entering compulsory detox centres 
and 197,000 receiving community drug rehabilitation, (China Daily 5th November 2015).
Police have discovered triad gangs were involved in well organised, cross border syndicates. Operation 
Thunderbolt, jointly operated between Hong Kong, Macao and Guangdong police netted 1,191 people in 
a month long crackdown on cross -border triads. Gambling dens and vice venues were shut, 40 kilos of 
ketamine were seized and contraband and counterfeit cigarettes. Kowloon East in Hong Kong had actually 
noticed a decrease in gang activity since recent court sentences for money extortion such as imposing a 
monopoly on the purchase of construction worker lunch boxes. In the northern territories of Hong Kong, 
the main income for gangs comes from illegal gambling. Police noted that some young people were hir-
ing boats for boat trips with friends where they took drugs. Officers from the Crime Prevention Bureau 
in Hong Kong were seeking to stop triads from recruiting young people, (China Daily 17th Aug 2012).
Cocaine remains expensive and thus less popular in Hong Kong. Nevertheless police smashed a high 
level and cross-country cocaine tracking syndicate during Operation Vanquisher. Lee (2009) notes that 
‘over 75 per cent of drug offences by juveniles under the age of 21 yrs typically use Ketamine, whilst 
cocaine only accounts for approximately 55 of offences’.
Zhang Jun, Vice President of the Supreme People’s Court commented that ‘a majority of drug crimes 
are now linked to gangs’, (Chuanjiao 2009b). The announcement noted that courts dealt with nearly 44,000 
drug cases in 2008 which was up by 12 per cent on the previous year. Drug-related crime was commonly 
now associated with gangs and violence including a shift in trends from importing ketamine to making 
it domestically. Raw materials were now often smuggled in and new drugs such as methamphetamine 
were starting to replace opium and heroin. In 2008 there were 12,243 Methamphetamine related crimes 
(up 61 per cent) and a further 5,251 from January to May in 2009. This has led to the production of 
methamphetamine in local apartment blocks and the greater use of gang affiliated youth to deliver and 
manufacture such drugs. Criminal law in China for smuggling, trading, transporting, manufacturing or 
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trafficking drugs or even possessing drugs 1kg or more of drugs is liable to a minimum of seven years 
imprisonment. The death penalty is instigated or larger amounts. This type of criminal activity is most 
commonly located in the provinces of Guangdong, Gaunxi, Yunnan, Sichuan and Guizhou. The Supreme 
People court has recently toughened its sanctions for those involved in drug offences with new unified 
capital punishment sanctions for those involved in trafficking using force, international drug trafficking, 
instigating minors to deal drugs, or those providing premises for drug manufacture, (Chuanjiao 2009b).
E-Crime
Other operational adaptations include the move into Internet crime with some ‘e-crime’ gangs now 
targeting older women and approximately 70 per cent of victims are elderly and female. Often they are 
tricked into releasing bank account details. A crackdown found gangs operating out of six counties in 
mainlined China using connections to Taiwan and southeast Asia to avoid detection. More than 1,400 
suspects were recently detained due to suspected involvement. According to news reports, ‘The gangs 
act like corporations with departments in charge of technology and others in charge of transferring the 
money’, (China Daily 31th Aug 2009).
More Talk, Less Fighting
One noticeable outcome in Hong Kong has been a recent change in how triads operate. This is noticeable 
in terms of visibility, levels of violence, influence and ways of operating. Some leading triad members 
have shifted their focus from illegal business into quasi-legal business.
Deng, (2012), writing in the China Daily, reports that ‘the city’s triad menace related to youth gangs is 
abating, thanks in large part to the efforts of the police to crack down on the violence, and social workers 
‘to encourage many young gang members to give up the criminal lifestyle and go straight’. Deng notes 
that rival gang groups of up to 100 youth would congregate for fighting whilst others became involved 
in taking ketamine and then playing gaming machines.
To address such issues, the Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups has been working with 200 ‘at 
risk’ teenagers. Their activities have reduced the impact and threat of violence from such groups com-
pared to a year ago according to NGOs. The social work outreach team have worked with young kids 
trying to get them to desist from gang membership. As one youth worker noted back in 2011,
Three nights out of seven we could see triad fights or looting in the neighbourhood. Not all incidents 
were reported to the police. Sometimes you could see a gang of 40 kids dressed in black hanging out 
in the basketball court. You could see them in the shopping arcades. (Ken Yeung, a youth worker from 
Won Tai Sin Outreaching Social Work Team). 
In 2010, 30 young people under 20 were arrested and charged with wounding and a further 82 with 
assault. At Easter 2011 police and social workers were struggling to keep up with referrals and fights 
mostly between those 14- 19. In 2011, 30 were charged with wounding and 63 with serious assault ac-
cording to the Police Public Relations Branch in Hong Kong, (Deng, 2012).
Local police operate with informers but resolving issues via the police is not common as many triads 
settle conflict via cash payments. It is apparently not uncommon for a gang member suffering grievous 
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injury to withdraw his accusation saying he can no longer recognize who inflicted the wounds, (Deng 
2012).
The reduction in violence or the reduced inclination to violence has also been noticed by Sociolo-
gist Lee King Wa from Chinese University in Hong Kong. He believes the move away from violence is 
partly due to policing tactics and partially due to a desire to invest in local businesses and cross-border 
schemes such as the trade in milk powder. He believes that the move into legit businesses has interrupted 
the triad chain of command as lower-ranks sometimes now act independently without the counsel of the 
Big Brothers, (Parry, 2013).
This view is supported by other academics who note it has become more difficult to recruit foot 
soldiers: ‘In terms of structure they (the gangs) are not as organised as in the past. They used to be 
more concerned about the Brotherhood...that made it easier for them to recruit foot soldiers to commit 
crimes for them - but now it is getting more difficult’, (Sharon Kwok of City University, Hong Kong, 
(Parry, 2013).
Whilst younger triad members will often do work for the Brotherhood (triad elders) without pay, 
Parry (2013) reports that now on occasion youngsters will be paid by triad members just to show up in 
a show of strength against rivals.
There are some indications that violence, although less frequent, is perhaps now sporadic and un-
controlled. Parry, (2013), reports that lower level triads, which often recruited from schools in large 
quantities to keep the triad societies thriving over the past 20 years, now sometimes operate outside the 
control of their bosses. This in turn leads younger members to get involved in violence because they 
are now less controlled by the older Brothers than in the past. Previously they would seek permission 
to fight however now they may just fight if they wish to. Also there are reports that they are less picky 
in choosing members and have different members in different areas. As the juniors recruit their own 
members the seniors are often cut off from this new network. This view has been supported by other 
authors such as Lee Kwing-wa, sociologist at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. As he mentioned, 
Triads now ‘talk more and they fight less. They are more calculating, more rational, and it is less about 
sub-culture and Brotherhood. They talk more about benefits. Different triad groups work together to get 
business done’,(Parry, 2013).
Characteristics of Youth Gangs in China
Chinese studies have begun to decipher the different emerging characteristics of youth gangs in China 
which permits us to summarise the knowledge as follows:
Prevalence
During the 1950s and 1960s youth gangs in China were not considered a problem. Their presence was 
reported at being as low as 6 cases per 100,000. However by 2005 this had risen to 356 per 100,000, 
(Zhang, Messner & Liu, 2008). Urban street gangs have in fact been developing and emerging in China 
since the 1970s and 1980s (Zhang 2002 & Zhang et al 1997) suggesting socio-economic reforms cre-
ated the climate for street gangs to emerge. However as in the West, statistics are clouded by definitional 
difficulties, interpretation and collation reluctance, denial and central authorities reluctance to honestly 
reflect the situation in some cities least they be assessed by central government as under-performing 
(Covey 2010).
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Despite this, it appears that the huge economic developments occurring in China over the last 30 
years have been mirrored by cultural changes and sifting patterns of crime, notably juvenile delinquency 
and increased patterns of offending (Zu-Yuan 1998). Although formal and official data remains elusive, 
Xiang (1999) identified that approximately 7 per cent of youth delinquency was in fact gang-related. 
More recently in 2008 Zhao (2008) reported increased gang activity in China.
Cao and Dai (2001) have noted that economic changes have led to increased anomie in China alongside 
considerable inequality between rural and urban areas and also specifically within urban areas. These 
social changes allow the expression of individualism and personal freedoms with ideological expectations 
now diminishing alongside the ideological control that was so associated with China’s communist rule.
The prevalence of gang involvement in China and gang participation in the West was recently ex-
amined by Webb et al (2011) by undertaking a self-reporting study amongst school groups. Results 
indicated that the US sample displayed a higher prevalence of self-nominated gang membership than in 
China. The Chinese sample was also lower in ‘last year’ and ‘life time’ participation in various criminal 
activities than in the US sample. As might be expected due to the different cultural and social contexts, 
there were also definitional challenges re the term gang.
Delinquent Behaviour and Gang Involvement
A recent study by Pyrooz and Decker considers the relationships between delinquent behaviour and gang 
involvement in China and involved gathering self-reported data from 2,245 school youth in Changzhi 
in northern China. They found over half the respondents engaged in some form of delinquency in the 
previous year with 11 per cent reporting gang involvement. Current or former gang members had higher 
likelihood of overall delinquency and specialisation in violence. Pyrooz and Decker (2012) found that 
the relationship between gangs and violence, delinquency and offending were similar to those found in 
the West.
There is no history of self-reported gang studies in China as there is in the US and any use is limited, 
(Zhang 2008). Webb et al (2011) however did undertake a study of school youth using self-reported 
questionnaires using the International Self-Report Delinquency (ISRD-2) questionnaire to undertake a 
comparative analysis between China and the US. Here Pyrooz and Decker (2012) found Chinese youth 
had lower levels of self-reported delinquent behaviour and lower levels of self-reported gang membership 
than US youth. However those that did self-report as gang-affiliated reported greater levels of offending 
and victimisation.
Pyrooz and Decker (2012) argue that results from their self-reported study of Chinese school youth 
indicate that established criminological theory to explain delinquency can be applied to Chinese youth. 
They also maintain that parental monitoring, parent and school attachment, peer association and low 
self-control were correlated with likelihood to offend and specialise in violence.
Organisation
In China youth crime gangs (qing shao mian fan zui taun huo) are considered to be loosely connected 
groups of males aged between 14-25 yr involved in criminal offending, (Zhang (2014). Youth street 
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gangs are thought to differ from organised crime due to their fluid membership, limited cohesion, limited 
level of organisation and varying definitions of co-offending and group offending particular to China.
Chinese studies have recently come to view contemporary youth gangs in China as more organised 
and more violent, more technology oriented and engaged in wider types of criminal activity than in the 
past (Zhang 2014); as a result youth gangs are now an issue of public concern for many Chinese.
To determine levels of organisation within street gangs, Zhang L. (1997) compared both China and 
US using data from an inmate survey in Tainjin, comparing youth gang characteristics, types of of-
fences and criminal justice responses. Findings show that the level of organisation in a Chinese gang is 
low compared to the US and that most activity is from mid-teens to early twenties before levelling off 
– this is consistent with US research. The study of inmates in Tianjin prisons and reform camps identi-
fied four key characteristics of gangs in China. Firstly the level of gang organisation is said to be low. 
Secondly membership is age-graded and often transitory. Thirdly gangs were territorial and associated 
with clearly defined spatial neighbourhoods. Lastly offending was what Malcolm Klein (1995) would 
call, ‘cafeteria-style’ and often low level.
In a further study by Lee et al (1996) of 36 Hong Kong street gangs, the authors found both core 
and fringe members and that the gangs were not cohesive. They operated autonomously only referring 
to triad links when in dispute with rival gangs. As in much gang research there was no mention of the 
role played by girls.
Chu (2000) remains sceptical of the organised nature of such affiliated noting that street gangs often 
over-claim allegiance – similar to gang ‘wannabe’s’ in the West.
The Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups believes that the use of Whatsapp has also changed the 
ways youth gangs and triads link up and organise. The App brings multiple young people into a fight 
instantly whereas otherwise they may simply sit at home and play computer games or take drugs in 
stairways. Triad clashes are mostly internal rivalries within the triad, (Deng 2012).
Membership
Some differences between western gangs and those in China are more are evident. In China ‘Fellow 
workers’ and ‘provincials’ are a ‘relatively common’ source of gang membership. This interesting dif-
ference reflects the unique social structure of China particularly regarding employment and migration. 
As found in Russian street gangs and youth groups in China, the workplace often acts as the centre of 
association and occasionally gang formation (Zhang (2002) and Zhang et al 1997).
Also gang membership does not appear to be correlated to the seriousness of the offense or reason for 
incarceration – this differs from the USA. Lastly gang related crime does increase the severity of punish-
ment. This is in line with current official policy of cracking down on gangs, (Zhang 1997). Matheron 
(1988) also noted that street gangs can act as a ‘probationary period’ for some young gang members 
before permission to full tiered membership.
Other observations by Zhang (1997) about Chinese street gangs reflect similar gang structures and 
hierarchies and membership as found in the West; i.e. gangs are largely male, aged between 15-25 with 
core and peripheral membership and links to local city or neighbourhood territories. Whilst free gang 
association is always an option many Chinese youth prefer to join gangs associated with triads (Che 
1992; Wong 1999).
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Loyalty
Chinese studies have identified that youth bond together for common support, common interests, protec-
tion, and engage in anti-social behaviour, (Zhou et al 2004; Liu, 2004, Zhang 2014). They also group 
together for joint criminal enterprise and act together out of bonds of loyalty to friends, which is generally 
considered to be a ‘primary moral standard’ (Zhang 2014) and expected social requirement in China. 
Indeed the research study of inmates in Tianjin stated that 60 per cent of the respondents cited loyalty 
to friends as the main reason for gang affiliation.
Zhang (1997) and (Covey 2010) both rightly identify that Chinese moral codes of loyalty to family 
and friends often underpin affiliation and associations at work as well as in the formation of criminal 
networks.
Recidivism
High levels of recidivism were also identified by researchers Zhang and Huang (1984) who undertook 
research into 100 youth gangs in Guangzhou. They identified that 49 per cent of gang members were 
recidivists. This is considered important as recidivists were central in overseeing gang recruitment, 
training, and organising of activity alongside maintaining discipline and solidarity, (Zhang 2014). As 
the China Daily news reported, ‘From 2002 to 2011, the rate of recidivism of China’s juvenile offenders 
remained at 1 per cent to 2 per cent, according to a white paper on judicial reform published in October 
of 2012’, (China Daily 23rd Sept 2013).
Ken Yeung, a youth worker from Won Tai Sin Outreaching Social Work Team, notes that repeat 
offending within the triad often helps to embed the youngster within the triad subculture. After a while 
these youngsters find it difficult to go back into normal society. Yeung acknowledges that those who 
are more embedded will find it difficult to withdraw and desist and those with chaotic or difficult home 
lives often stay embedded, (Deng 2012).
Summary
Wang (2006), Zhang (2001) and Zhou et al (2004) have summarised some key characteristic of Chinese 
gangs thus: Some gangs have defined leadership however mostly the level of group organisations is low; 
Membership status is generally changeable and impermanent; membership is based on neighbourhood 
territory, age and occupation (e.g. co-workers, neighbours, school mates); lastly, criminal activity largely 
involves crime against property and interpersonal violence, (though some specialise in property or vice, 
most engage in multiple criminal activity), (Zhang 2014).
Risk Factors for Youth Gang Affiliation
Chinese research into youth delinquency and gangs suggests that the common risk factors or predictors 
for delinquency include levels of attachment to school, moral adherence to Chinese culture, harmony be-
tween the generations and integration within society, (Wong 1999; Wong 2001; Zhang & Messner, 1996).
In addition, as identified above, both triads and youth street gangs have been sustained over the years 
through migration and immigration.
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The Role of Rural: Urban Migration
The Hukou urban registration system established by the Communist regime effectively initiated a dual 
system of citizenship separating rural from urban citizens. It prevented rural citizens from becoming 
urban citizens and was designed to limit migration from rural to urban areas in an attempt to address 
increasing urbanisation. The economic reforms initiated from the 1980s onwards immediately drew 
attention to the large surplus of rural labour and the deficit of labour in the expanding urbanised cities. 
The response was to slacken the restrictions resulting in large migrant movements to the cities. One 
result, aside from rapid urbanisation, has been a concentration of poor rural migrants in poor and under-
serviced neighbourhoods, (Zhang 2014). If lucky they will eventually move to cramped multi-occupancy 
high-rise developments on the periphery of cities.
Citing Adamson (1998) Ngai, Cheung and Ngai (2007) note that the multiplicity of high-rise housing 
often tends to diminish community integration in neighbourhoods and may thus act as a future catalyst 
for gang involvement in China.
One example is the influx of migrants into new towns such as Tseung Kwan O in Hong Kong. This 
new town had a population of around 100,000 in 1999 and it now stands at nearly 400,000 with 17.5 
per cent of the population aged between 10 – 24 yrs. A recent survey in the new town by Caritas Youth 
and Community Service found that half of the 140 teenagers interviewed claim at least one friend who 
is connected to triads or is a member of a triad; 30 per cent of the young respondents said they had 
been harassed by triads themselves. Many triads had local influence before the new towns were built 
as they operated from local villages. The new towns simply provided opportunities for them to expand 
their power and to recruit new members. However, younger members are often ‘fractious and easily 
provoked’. In Tseung Kwan O, approximately 90 per cent of the triad members are affiliated to Sun Yee 
On triad, (Deng 2012).
Children from migrant families are not allowed to attend public high schools in cities. In addition to 
being separated from their parents they often have to undertake their own schooling at home. Whilst some 
attend primary or middle educational schools, resources and opportunities are limited. Citing a recent 
Education report from the 21st Century Education Research Institute realised in April 2015, Wangshu 
(2015) notes that 20 per cent of the 278.9 million children in China were not able to enter public school 
in 2013. This is despite an order from central government for local government authorities to ensure 
migrants can enter local high schools, but city authorities who are attempting to control population 
increases have often tightened their polices and restricted access. The report which sought to analyse 
China’s educational reforms in 2014 noted that around 36.7 per cent of juvenile criminals attend neither 
school nor work. Around 27 per cent of juvenile criminals are children whose parents leave them at 
home whilst the parents seek migrant work in cities and a further 27 per cent of juvenile offenders are 
children who travel with their parents as migrants to work in cities. According to the national census 
of 2010, around 35.8 million children in China under the age of 18 travel with their migrant worker 
parents whilst a further 61 million children are left in rural areas when their parents work in the cities, 
(Wangshu 21st April 2015).
One response of rural migrants has been for young migrants to group together in street gangs. These 
gangs are largely comprised of youth from the same province, village or town. These regional ties and 
the Guanxi, or social capital, acquired by family and neighbour ties, act as binding agents for those 
coming together for criminal activity.
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One high profile article in the China Daily reflected the public debates on migrants suggesting that 
second generation migrants are not as ‘hardworking’ as the first and become more involved in crime. 
Often they realise they have a skills deficit and resort to criminal activity. The Statistics from the People’s 
Supreme Court indicate that in 2007, approximately 316,000 juvenile offenders were sentenced, which 
accounted for one third of China’s convicted prisoners: of these some 87,500 were minors, (China Daily 
30th Dec 2008).
In line with the argument of migration leading to increased offending, areas with a high rate of migrant 
influx, such as Guandong have noticed an increase in juvenile offending. For example in Guangdong, 
(which has 2 million juvenile offenders accounting for almost a quarter of its total population, from 2003 
– 2007), the Nanfang Daily newspaper reported juvenile criminal offences increased by 18 per cent year 
on year. The No1 Criminal Law Court of Jiangsu High People’s Court recorded that migrant teenagers 
were responsible for 87 per cent and 80 per cent of juvenile offences in the cities of Suzhou and Wuxi, 
respectively. In Zhejiang province in Haishu district, the People’s court of Ningbo, (the regional capital) 
migrant juveniles accounted for 95 per cent of criminal prosecutions. The chief of the Court’s Juvenile 
Tribunal Service was quoted as saying criminals are becoming younger and often have lower educational 
backgrounds. Approximately three-quarters of juvenile crimes were property related with violence, often 
including theft and robbery. He further noted that ‘crime committed by girls are also becoming crueller 
and differ less from those of the boys’, (China Daily 30th Dec 2008).
In 2009, under the China Daily headline – ‘Raising the issue of China’s Troubled teens’, the investiga-
tive reporter Xie Chuanjiao, reported on research conducted by the Beijing Municipal Higher People’s 
court, identified that the majority of juvenile offenders came from migrant families whose children 
experience poor parental care, neglect and limited educational input. Their study indicated that between 
40- 80 per cent of delinquency in the city over the previous three years was by migrant youth with no 
household registration. Those from single parent homes and those leaving school early were particu-
larly at risk of offending. Of 100 studied cases of young people aged 16-18 years, only 16 per cent of 
juveniles were attending school at the time of the offence. Property crime, theft and robbery were most 
prevalent followed by assaults and rapes. Interestingly the report noted bias in schools against migrant 
students with some being charged extra fees. Guangdong province, (which has by 2009 upwards of 30 
million migrant workers) had recently revised its rules to permit migrants who had lived in the prov-
ince for more than seven years to apply for permanent residence permits. Such permits then allow their 
children to free schooling for nine years and thus save their parents thousands of yuan. In Shanghai, 
whilst the rates of delinquency of local youth have remained stable (until 2009), crimes committed by 
migrant youth has risen by almost 70 per cent from 2004- 2007. The city’s Municipal Higher People’s 
Court reported that 800 minors were convicted in 1998, rising to 2,682 in 2007. Of these, 1,833 did 
not have a local household registration and 86 per cent has no education beyond primary school. Zhang 
Haitang, the Vice President of the Shanghai Higher People’s Court allocated this rise to the increase in 
migrant population of the Shanghai region which has recently increased by 6.6 million including 604,000 
adolescents. It was suggested that traditional community or village groups or organisations assisted in 
addressing youth delinquency but this proved difficult in peri-urban areas dealing with large numbers 
of migrants, (Chuanjiao 2009a).
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Social Control
Wang et al (2002) found that Chinese children whose parents exert strong parental control are less likely to 
engage in delinquent behaviour, whilst those associating with delinquent peers are more likely to offend. 
Alongside social control mechanisms and social bond theory, cognitive development, notably academic 
achievement has been identified as reducing the risks of youth offending in gangs, (Wang et al 2002).
The cognitive and social influences which determine gang involvement have recently been studied by 
Ngai, Cheung and Ngai (2007) who undertook qualitative interviews with almost 1000 delinquent youth 
in three cities: Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Shanghai in 1999. All youth were accessed via youth service 
units, e.g. correctional schools, outreach and social work recruitment. The average age of respondents 
was 15.8 yrs and mostly male. They identified significant differences between the three cities of Hong 
Kong, Guangzhou and Shanghai. These differences arise largely due to the different social context of 
westernized and individualist systems operating in Hong Kong as opposed to socialist and collectivist 
traditions in mainland China. The results show that the role of parents and the influence of parental 
control are weaker in mainland China than in Hong Kong however the influence and social control of 
teachers and the tradition of authoritative control evident in mainland China helps to demonstrate the 
converse to this finding.
The Ngai, Cheung and Ngai (2007) study found that expected and prior gang involvement of re-
spondents was highest in Hong Kong. Conversely Hong Kong youth demonstrated the lowest scores on 
youth and friends moral beliefs, parental controls and teacher attachment. Hong Kong youth had higher 
engagement with social workers. Interestingly the effects of prior gang involvement were noticeably 
strong in Guangzhou and demonstrated a high predicator of gang activity, (Ngai, Cheung & Ngai, 2007). 
The authors claim the findings are supportive of the generality of social control functions, pro-social 
learning, educational attainment and problem solving abilities on Chinese delinquent youth and their 
involvement with gangs. The socio-cultural differences highlighted were that teachers and social workers 
are more authoritative in mainland China and in Hong Kong individual and parental influences are key; 
even though parents often exerted less control there than in mainland Chinese cites.
The study also found that Hong Kong had the highest level of educational attainment and Guangzhou 
the lowest. Many respondents in Guangzhou were recent arrivals. In line with reports on migrant fami-
lies struggling to adapt to newly urbanised conditions, Guangzhou youth tended to be boys with a lower 
socioeconomic background and had only been resident in Guangzhou for a short time. In this context 
teachers become the prime authoritative influence and control over migrant youth and possibly one of 
the few inhibitors for gang involvement. The Cultural hub of Shanghai was noted to have the highest level 
of further education amongst the youth surveyed, and in this context operated as an inhibitor for gang 
affiliation (Ngai, Cheung & Ngai 2007). Xi (2001) argues that in socialist collectivist mainland China, 
cognitive development plays a lesser role in youth gang desistence than might be expected.
In Hong Kong, maternal education and length of residence in the city were both positive predictors 
of youth gang affiliation. Parental controls were more effective in gang desistence in Hong Kong and 
‘attachment to authoritative professionals is more significant in a socialist collectivist country’, (Ngai, 
Cheung & Ngai 2007, p10). In terms of policy development to address gang affiliation then the authors 
claim ‘bolstering social integration and cohesion in the neighbourhood would be an effective way to 
deter gang involvement in a collectivist society’, (Ngai, Cheung & Ngai 2007).
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Parenting Practice
There has been considerable discussion and debate in the Chinese media about parenting styles in China 
and in particular the unexpected outcomes of the one-child policy. Some believe that China’s one-child 
policy has had a profound effect on parenting practice which in turn has impacted upon youth behaviour 
and delinquency (Zhang 2014). Zhang argues that Chinese parents develop ‘extraordinarily high expec-
tations’ of their child, expectations which are often unrealistic and go unmet. For those falling short of 
this high threshold, or who suffer the stress of fierce peer-group competition, behavioural problems can 
quickly surface, i.e. this can lead to drug addiction, for others, gang affiliation. Zhang (2014) claims many 
Chinese parents are more controlling of their children than Western parents and this brings added stress. 
Chinese parents, he claims, view their children as ‘little emperors’ within the family and often become 
spoiled. He suggests this creates a mix of permissive and controlling parenting which generates selfish 
and impulsive behaviours. Such issues have now become the focus of public debates in China. Indeed 
some Chinese studies suggest a clear link between such parenting practice and gang related crime and 
gang affiliation, (Liu 2004; Wang 2005). The All China Women’s Federation report that ‘left behind 
migrant children experience lack of security, family closeness, protection and reduced educational op-
portunities’. This has also led to debates about the influence of social media and TV and also an absence 
of moral education in favour of academic education, (China Daily 23rd Sept 2013). This however is 
a topic of little research. What is perhaps clearer is that those who become socially marginalised may 
drift into gang affiliation.
Recent Changes in Gangs
Importantly however the link between youth street gangs and organised crime remains rather elusive and 
further research is required to fully explain this. Despite crackdown, (e.g. Chongqing) there have been 
no evaluations as to the effectiveness of such policies.
The China Daily reported (27th Feb 2009) that organized crime increased sharply in 2008 despite a 
government crackdown on gangs according to the People’s Supreme Court.
The government is largely unreflexive in regards to youth gang crime and have yet to establish suit-
able and responsive mechanisms to address them. As a result punishment is based on the pre-established 
codes for addressing organised crime which tend to be more severe than what might be expected for 
such collective offending. Despite this, according to recent media coverage, these measures retain high 
levels of public support.
The general view is that youth gangs have emerged as a social problem in China though their full 
extent and activities remains somewhat unclear and under-researched, leading Zhang (2014) to call for 
more research and more theoretical engagement in this research. Pyrooz and Decker (2012) support this 
call for more research into group based violence and specialisation in violence recommending greater 
use of different methodologies to explore delinquency and gang studies.
REFERENCES
Adamson, C. (1998). Tribute, Turf, honor and the American street gang: Patterns of continuity and change 
since 1820. Theoretical Criminology, 2(1), 57–84. doi:10.1177/1362480698002001003
321
From “Little Flowers of the Motherland” into “Carnivorous Plants”
 
Bakken, B. (2004). Moral Panics, Crime Rates and Harsh Punishment in China. Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Criminology, 37(1 suppl), 37–89. doi:10.1177/00048658040370S105
Broadhurst, R. (2012). Chinese ‘Black Societies’ and triad-like organised crime in China. In F. Alum 
& S. Gilmour (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organised Crime (pp. 157–171). London: 
Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203698341.ch10
Broadhurst, R. (2013). The suppression of black societies in China. Trends in Organized Crime, 16(1), 
95–113. doi:10.1007/s12117-012-9174-0
Broadhurst, R., & Wa, L. K. (2009). The Transformation of Triad ‘Dark Societies’ in Hong Kong: The 
Impact of Law Enforcement, Socio –Economic and Political Change. Security Challenges, 5(4), 1–38.
Cao, L., & Dai, Y. (2001). Inequality in Crime and China. In J. Liu, L. Zhang, & S. Messner (Eds.), 
Crime and Social Control in a Changing China (pp. 73–88). Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
Che, W. (1992). Problems of juvenile delinquency in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: China Book.
Chin, K. (1986). Chinese triad societies, tongs organised crime and the street gangs in Asia and the 
United States. (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation). University of Pennsylvania.
Chin, K. (1990a). Chinese Gangs and Extortion. In Gangs in America. Sage Publications.
Chin, K. (1990b). Chinese subculture and criminality: Non-traditional crime groups in America. New 
York: Greenwood Press.
Chin, K. (2009). Hejiin: Organised Crime, Business and Politics in Taiwan. In T. W. Lo (Ed.), Beyond 
Social Capital: A Case of Triad Financial Crime in Hong Kong and China. City University of Hong Kong.
Chin, K., Kelly, R., & Fagan, J. (1993). Methodological issues in studying Chinese gang extortion. The 
Gang Journal, 1(2), 25–36.
Chin, K., & Zhang, S. (2003). The declining significance of Triad Societies in Transnational Illegal 
Activities: A Structural Deficiency Perspective. The British Journal of Criminology, 43(3), 469–488. 
doi:10.1093/bjc/43.3.469
China Daily. (2001, February 17). Curbing youth crime. China Daily.
China Daily. (2008, December 30). Juvenile crime up among migrants. China Daily.
China Daily. (2009a, February 16). Crime is a risk to stability: Official. China Daily.
China Daily. (2009b, February 20). Economic crime on rise, firms warned. China Daily.
China Daily. (2009c, February 27). Organized crime increases in 2008. China Daily.
China Daily. (2009d, April 28). Crackdown on crime in run-up to National Day. China Daily.
China Daily. (2009e, August 28). Gangs nabbed in Chongqing: 469 still at large. China Daily.
China Daily. (2009f, September 25). Anti-crime sweep smashes 1,300 gangs in south China. China Daily.
China Daily. (2009g, August 31). China’s ‘e-crime’ gangs target older women. China Daily.
322
From “Little Flowers of the Motherland” into “Carnivorous Plants”
 
China Daily. (2009h, September 1). Courts convict nearly 13,000 on organised crime charges. China Daily.
China Daily. (2009i, December 16). Money-laundering gang trial opens in SW China. China Daily.
China Daily. (2012, August 17). Nearly 1,200 snared in month long crackdown. China Daily.
China Daily. (2013a, September 23). Teen killers spur discussion on youth crime. China Daily.
China Daily. (2013b, September 23). Teen killers spur discussion on youth crime. China Daily.
China Daily. (2015a, May 11). Drug users exceed 14 million in China. China Daily.
China Daily. (2015b, June 25). String of youth violence cases shocks nation. China Daily.
China Daily. (2015c, July 10). Gang activity in Guangdong poses ‘serious threat’. China Daily.
Chu, Y. K. (2000). The Triads as Business. London: Routledge.
Chuanjiao, X. (2009a, May 7). Raising the issue of China’s Troubled teens. China Daily.
Chuanjiao, X. (2009b, June 26). Gangsters muscling their way into drugs. China Daily.
Cloward, R. A., & Ohlin, L. (1960). Delinquency and Opportunity. Glencoe: Free Press.
Deng, A. (2011, June 23). Bloody-minded youth. China Daily.
Deng, A. (2012, September 6). Just one of the gang. China Daily.
Dishman, C. (2005). The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge. Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, 28(3), 237–252. doi:10.1080/10576100590928124
Dutton, M. (1997). The basic character of crime in contemporary China, (Translation). The China Quar-
terly, 149, 160–177. doi:10.1017/S030574100004368X
Egely, A., & Howell, J. C. (2011). Highlights of the 2009 National Youth Gang Survey. Washington, DC: 
Office of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. doi:10.1037/e580942011-001
Harding, S. (2014). The Street Casino: survival in violent street gangs. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
doi:10.1332/policypress/9781447317173.001.0001
Huang, H. (2007). From the Asian Boys to the Zhu Lian Bang (the Bamboo Union Gang): A Typological 
analysis of Delinquent Asian Gangs. Asian Criminology, 2(2), 127–143. doi:10.1007/s11417-007-9033-0
Kelly, R., Chin, K., & Fagan, J. (1993, August). The Structure, Activity, and Control of Chinese 
Gangs: Law Enforcement Perspectives. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 9(3), 221–239. 
doi:10.1177/104398629300900304
Klein, M. (1995). The American street gang: its nature, prevalence, and control. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Lee, C. (2009, February 19). Police make largest cocaine seizure in yrs. China Daily.
Lee, F. W., Loi, T. W., & Wong, D. S. W. (1996). Intervention in the decision-making of youth gangs. 
Groupwork, 9(3), 292–302.
323
From “Little Flowers of the Motherland” into “Carnivorous Plants”
 
Lee, K. W. (2005). Triad-related homicide 1989-1998. (PhD thesis). University of Hong Kong.
Liu, C. (2004). The Characteristics and Causes of Youth Gang crime. Journal of ChangQiu Vocational 
and Technological College, 11, 55–56.
Liu, J. (2008). Data sources in Chinese crime and criminal Justice research. Crime, Law, and Social 
Change, 50(3), 131–147. doi:10.1007/s10611-008-9135-3
Luo, S. (2012, December 29). Living on the mean streets. China Daily.
Main, J. (1991). The Truth about triads. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & 
Management, 7(2), 144–163.
Matheron, M. S., (1988). China: Chinese triads, the Oriental Mafia. CJ International, 4(3), 26-27.
Ngai, N., Cheung, C., & Ngai, S. (2007, Summer). Cognitive and social influences on Gang involvement 
among delinquents in three Chinese cities. Adolescence, 42(166), 381–403. PMID:17849942
Paoli, L. (2002). The Paradoxes of Organised Crime. Crime, Law, and Social Change, 37(1), 51–97. 
doi:10.1023/A:1013355122531
Parry, S. (2013, November 8). Twilight of the triads. China Daily.
Pyrooz, D., & Decker, S. (2012). Delinquent Behaviour, Violence and Gang Involvement in China. 
Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 29(2), 251-272.
Shen, A., & Hall, S. (2015). The same the whole world over? A review essay on youth offending from 
the 1980s and youth justice in contemporary China. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice.
Song, J., & Dombrink, J. (1994). Asian emerging crime groups: Examining the definition of organised 
crime. Criminal Justice Review, 19(2), 228–243. doi:10.1177/073401689401900204
Song, J. H. L. (1996). The Asian Factor: Methodological barriers to the study of Asian Gangs and Or-
ganised crime. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 21(1), 1996.
South China Morning Post. (2004, January 17). Soaring Crime Rate Dims Shenzhen’s Luster. South 
China Morning Post.
South China Morning Post. (2006, May 10). Shenzhen is Key Gateway for illegal Drugs trade. South 
China Morning Post.
Spergel, I. (1961, March). An exploratory research in delinquent subcultures. The Social Service Review, 
35(1), 33–47. doi:10.1086/640985
Sun, I., Hu, R., & Wu, Y. (2012). Social Capital, political participation, and trust in the police in urban China. 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 45(1), 87–105. doi:10.1177/0004865811431329
Thrasher, F. M. (1927). The Gang: A study of 1,313 gangs in Chicago. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.
Varese, F. (2006). How Mafias Migrate. Law & Society Review, 40(2), 411–444. doi:10.1111/j.1540-
5893.2006.00260.x
324
From “Little Flowers of the Motherland” into “Carnivorous Plants”
 
Wang, G. T., Qiao, H., Wei, S., & Zhang, J. (2002). Adolescent social bond, self-control and deviant 
behaviour in China. International Journal of Contemporary Sociology, 39(1), 52–68.
Wang, P. (2013). The increasing threat of Chinese organised crime: National, regional and international 
perspective. The RUSI Journal, 158(4), 6–18. doi:10.1080/03071847.2013.826492
Wang, P., & Antonopoulos, G. (2015). Organised Crime and illegal gambling: How do illegal gambling 
enterprises respond to the challenges posed by their illegality in china? Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Criminology, 0(0), 1–23.
Wangshu, L. (2015, April 21). Migrant life may lead to youth crime. China Daily.
Webb, V. J., Ren, L., Zhao, J., He, N., & Marshall, I. H. (2011). A comparative study of youth gangs 
in China and the United States: Definition, offending and victimisation. International Criminal Justice 
Review, 21(3), 225–242. doi:10.1177/1057567711418825
(2010). What is Organized Crime? InVarese, F. (Ed.), Organized Crime. Routledge.
Whitwell, T. (2014, June 13). Inside Shenzhen: China’s Silicon Valley. The Guardian.
Wong, D. S. (1999, April). Delinquency Control and Juvenile Justice in China. Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Criminology, 32(1), 27–41. doi:10.1177/000486589903200104
Wong, D. S. (2004, December). Juvenile Protection and Delinquency Prevention Policies in China. 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 37(1), 52–66. doi:10.1177/00048658040370S104
Wong, S. K. (1999). Delinquency of Chinese-Canadian youth: A test of opportunity, control and inter-
generational conflict theories. Youth & Society, 29(1), 112–133. doi:10.1177/0044118X97029001005
Wong, S. S. W. (2001). Pathways to delinquency in Hong Kong and Guangzhou (south China). Inter-
national Journal of Adolescence and Youth, 10(1/2), 91–115. doi:10.1080/02673843.2001.9747893
Wu, Y., Sun, I., & Hu, R. (2015). Public Trust in the Chinese police: The impact of ethnicity, class and 
Hukou. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, (Jan), 21.
Xi, J. (2001). Research reports on China’s Youth. Beijing, China: China Youth.
Xiang, G. (1999). Delinquency and its prevention in China. International Journal of Offender Therapy 
and Comparative Criminology, 43(1), 61–70. doi:10.1177/0306624X99431006
Yoder, K. A., Whitbeck, K. B., & Hoyt, O. R. (2003). Gang involvement and membership among home-
less and runaway youth. Youth & Society, 34(4), 441–467. doi:10.1177/0044118X03034004003
Zhang, B. (2001). The Characteristics of Youth Gangs. Journal of Fu Jain Police College, 62, 40–95.
Zhang, L. (2008). Juvenile delinquency and justice in contemporary China: A critical review of the lit-
erature over 15 years. Crime, Law, and Social Change, 50(3), 149–160. doi:10.1007/s10611-008-9137-1
Zhang, L. (2014). Of Marginality and ‘Little Emperors’: The changing Reality of Chinese Youth Gangs. 
In Global Gangs: Street Violence across the world. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
doi:10.5749/minnesota/9780816691470.003.0005
325
From “Little Flowers of the Motherland” into “Carnivorous Plants”
 
Zhang, L., & Messner, S. F. (1996). School attachment and official delinquency status in the People’s 
Republic of China. Sociological Forum, 11(2), 285–303. doi:10.1007/BF02408368
Zhang, L., Messner, S. F., & Liu, J. (2008). A Critical Review of Recent Literature on Crime and Criminal 
Justice in China: Research Findings, Challenges and Prospects (Introduction). Crime, Law and Social 
Change: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 50, 125-130.
Zhang, L., Messner, S. F., Lu, Z., & Deng, X. (1997). Gang crime and its punishment in china. Journal 
of Criminal Justice, 25(4), 289–302. doi:10.1016/S0047-2352(97)00014-7
Zhang, L., Messner, S. F., Lu, Z., & Deng, X. (1997). Gang crime and its punishment in China. Journal 
of Criminal Justice, 25(4), 289–302. doi:10.1016/S0047-2352(97)00014-7
Zhang, L., Zhang, L., & Lei, X. (1993). China’s Juvenile Delinquency and Justice. Beijing, China: 
World Knowledge.
Zhang, S. X. (2002). Chinese Gangs: Familial and cultural dynamics. In C. R. Huff (Ed.), Gangs in 
America III. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. doi:10.4135/9781452232201.n14
Zhang, Z., & Huang, W. (1984). The role of recidivists in Delinquent Gangs. In Yearbook on Chinese 
Juvenile Delinquency Studies. Association of Chinese Juvenile Delinquency Study.
Zhou, L., Liu, W., & Wang, Z. (2004). Contemporary Positivist Criminology: A Study of Crime Patterns. 
Beijing: Publishing House of People’s Courts.
Zie, Z. (2008, December 22). China planning special unit to tackle gangs. China Daily.
Zu-Yuan, H. (1988). China: Juvenile delinquency and its prevention. CJ International, 4(5), 5–10.
